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ABSTRACT
This paper makes an attempt to estimate the index of informal sector employment 
which can be attributed to the supply-push phenomenon. Factors which explain the 
inter-state  variations  include  the  industrial-informal  sector  wage  gap,  revenue 
expenditure, and development expenditure incurred by the government. Increased 
development expenditure brings in a decline in distress-led informalization. With 
improved  education,  health,  and  infrastructure  facilities  the  employability  of  an 
individual goes up, which, in turn, reduces the compulsion to get absorbed residually. 
However, expansion in government activities measured through increased revenue 
expenditure raises in-migration, which in turn raises the supply-push phenomenon. 
We also observed that with an increase in distress-led informalization inequality 
tends to rise. Adoption of labour intensive technology in the organized industrial 
sector is indeed crucial for pro-poor growth. The other policy implication is in terms 
of enhanced investment in the areas of education, health and other infrastructural 
facilities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Issues concerning the residual absorption of labour in the low productivity informal sector 
have already received a great deal of attention in the past. In the present context of globaliza-
tion, while most countries are aiming at maximizing growth, the issue of well-being has be-
come increasingly important. One of the crucial dimensions of well-being is access to pro-
ductive employment opportunities. Thus the concept of pro-poor growth and various other 
questions relating informalization have acquired prominence in the development literature.   
Growth that is currently taking place is accompanied by informalization, e.g. sub-
contracting in the production process and various other mechanisms that tend to leave la-
bour with less bargaining power. On the whole, the informalization process is feared to in-
volve substantial welfare losses and deterioration in terms of governance. There is also 
concern on industrialization issues and, accordingly, it has led policy makers and academi-
cians to debate and design policies for providing a safeguard against global imbalances. It is 
often observed that producers engaged in small enterprises in the informal sector cater to 
local and regional demand. The argument which is usually put forward in this context is to 
enhance the educational level and technical skills, which in turn would promote graduation 
of labour to the formal sector. Keeping some of these issues in mind, this paper makes an 
attempt to estimate  the supply-push component of the informal sector employment across 
the Indian states and identifies factors that determine this supply-push informalization. The 
paper, in particular, examines whether education and skill development promote participa-
tion in the formal sector. Finally, we investigate whether this type of informalization leads to 
a rise in inequality in the economy and deterioration in well-being. 
In the developing world, around 60 to 70 per cent of the total manufacturing employ-
ment is located in the informal sector (Agenor 1996). An issue of concern in the present 
context is whether the informal sector workers are able to face the challenges of globaliza-
tion. In a recent work, Kiso (2008), based on three consecutive surveys (1991, 1998, and 
2006), of the same sample set of textile workers in Ahmedabad, observed that more than 50 
percent workers were in the informal sector. Marjit et al. (2007) argued that liberal trade and 
investment policies may expand or contract output and employment in the informal sector. 
Several papers in the volume edited by Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur (2006) analysed the 
state of informal enterprises in the developing world. Mitra (2004) focused on the use of in-
formal networks, which in turn bind the informal sector workers to low income jobs. This 
process restricts their upward mobility, though at the entry level these networks play a cru-
cial role in providing sources of livelihood. 
Maiti and Marjit (2008) argue that with greater exposure to international trade, a com-
peting export firm in the formal sector shifts much of its efforts towards marketing, leaving 4
production activities to the informal sector. In a study based on fieldwork, Maiti (2008) 
further showed that the small-scale rural industries are expanding and have survived in the 
post-reforms India in a subcontracting arrangement as a part of the production process of 
the relatively larger firms or traders. Goldar et al. (forthcoming), on the other hand, argue 
that economic reforms have been accompanied by growing consumerism and an increas-
ing demand of consumers for quality products. This is obviously expected to have a signifi-
cantly adverse effect on the demand for the unorganized/informal sector output.
In a study of Latin American countries, Goldberg and Pavnick (2003), suggest that re-
forms led to an increase in wage inequality and a moderate increase in income inequality in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Regardless of whether wage and income inequality were 
rising or not, trade reform was accompanied by reductions in poverty, mainly through reduc-
tions in the cost of the consumption bundle of the poor and reduction in unemployment. 
Policies relating to the provision of education, access to credit and insurance, flexible entry 
and exit of firms, and access to infrastructure and technical assistance, can help the poor to 
maximize the new economic opportunities offered by trade reforms.
The role of education has therefore appeared as one of the principal policy instruments 
for poverty alleviation. As the growth literature also suggests, improvements in the average 
education level accelerate growth through productivity-enhancement and knowledge spill-
over. A large body of research using individual level data on education and income provides 
robust evidence in favour of a substantial payoff attached to investment in education (Krue-
ger and Lindahl 2001). One corollary of this argument seems to suggest that the provision of 
higher education would unambiguously promote growth, which will be accompanied by a 
shift in the work force structure away from the informal towards the formal sector. However, 
it may not be a smooth process because of the segmentation of the economy.  Due to the 
structural bottlenecks, a large component of the work force cannot be absorbed in the formal 
sector and, rather, they are left in the low cost production sector to cater to the local market. 
The poor cannot easily access the external market without investing in education, establish-
ing networks, and pursuing rigid registration procedures for formalization. Removal of rigid 
procedures, extension of subsidies, and educational facilities may enable the workers to 
graduate from the informal to the formal sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical motivation. Sec-
tion 3 presents an estimate of informal sector employment in non-agricultural activities and, 
based on stochastic function framework, an index of informal sector employment is worked 
out that can be attributed to the supply-push phenomenon. In section 3, based on the cross-
sectional variations, the important determinants of this index are identified and, also, we 
assess the impact of supply-push informalization on inequality. Finally, in section 4 the ma-
jor findings are summarized. 5
2. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION
We, here, develop a simple framework to see under what conditions education can pro-
mote participation in the formal sector. Suppose a producer in the informal sector, who is 
capital constrained, produces to cater to the local market. He manufactures certain goods 
to supply to the final producers, traders, or directly to the consumers in the local market. 
Suppose the cost of manufacturing the products is cq2 , where the marginal cost is 2cq. 
Here, c is a positive parameter of the marginal cost of production and q is the output pro-
duced by the firm. The price of the goods in the local market is unity and, thereby, an infor-
mal sector producer can attain one unit value for each product sold in the local market. But, 
he can top up this value if he can send his products to a market outside the local area. In 
order to do so, he requires exposure, technical and marketing skills, a proper management 
education, and training. The basic intuition is that if an individual gets this sort of education 
and training, he can successfully access the modern marketing network and, thus, sell to 
the outside market at higher prices. So, the level of education and training, denoted by e, 
matters for achieving a higher price of the product, that is, α(e); α’>0 , α’’<0 and α(0)=0. 
In other words, with a higher level of education and training, the exposure to sell the 
product at the national/international market would be greater.1  But, such education is not 
costless. Moreover, an informal sector producer cannot sell products to an outside market 
without a proper registration and trade license. The legal system is such that he would not be 
allowed to cater to the outside market without proper registration, which requires formal 
procedures involving substantial time and fees. The investment on training and registration 
together are assumed, for the sake of simplicity, to be A in period one and after period one 
it becomes A(1+r)e2, where r is denoted as the market rate of interest. Now the profit func-
tion of the firm can be expressed as: 
In the first stage, the firm takes the decision simultaneously as to whether it would pro-
duce in the formal or informal sector, and what would be the optimal level of education. At 
the second stage, the optimum level of production will be solved.  This is done using the 
backward induction technique.
Differentiating (1) with respect to q and equating to 0 we get:
1   Similar specification is also available in Maiti and Marjit (2008).6
Substituting for output into   we get:
Differentiating the above expression with respect to e we get:
From the above profit function, the optimum level of education can be solved. For a criti-
cal value of   e, that is, e=e*, we can work out the  . This is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Optimum level of education
Now, if   In other words, the firm can earn a positive profit 
from the local market without having education and formal registration. 
Comparing the profit levels,   and  , the firm will decide whether formalization is 
beneficial or not. If  , the firm does not want to cater to the outside market and it 
remains in the informal sector. If  , the owner of the firm remains indifferent be-
tween the level of education at 0 and e*. But he prefers to opt for e=0 because there is no 
incentive to go for higher education.
Suppose the government takes some initiative to uplift the quality of education, that is, 
shift the  (e), and reduces the costs of formalization, or ensures better transport facility (that 7
is, to raise p) by raising development expenditure, the profit can be raised and the aspiration 
for education can be enhanced. 
Similarly, educational subsidy, interest subsidy, loans to firms, reduction in cost of edu-
cation, and formal registration (reducing A) will yield similar results.  Therefore, we can infer 
that education may be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for joining the formal sec-
tor2. Education combined with investment in public utilities will encourage formal sector 
participation. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we examine some of the implications of the theoretical construct from the 
empirical standpoint. As regards the informal sector employment, the National Sample 
Survey Organization (NSSO) came up with estimates for non-agricultural activities, corre-
sponding to the years 1999–2000 and 2004–05. In order to derive the absolute number of 
workers in the informal and the formal sectors we have adopted the following steps. 
First, given the population figures from the censuses of 1991 and 2001 the average an-
nual growth rates have been computed on the basis of which population for the year 1999–
2000 and 2004–05 have been projected. Given the NSSO estimates of worker (principal plus 
subsidiary) to population ratio, the absolute number of workers for these two years has been 
derived. In the next step, the NSSO estimates, of per thousand distribution of workers across 
different activities, have been applied to derive the absolute number of workers in each of the 
activities. In the third step, NSSO’s results of the survey on the informal sector workers in non-
agricultural activities have been used to split the total workers in each activity into informal 
and formal components. The NSSO’s estimate of the per thousand distribution of workers in 
the informal  sector is applied to the absolute number of workers in each activity to derive the 
absolute number of workers in the informal sector, which has been then deducted from the 
total number of workers in each activity to deduce the formal sector workers3.     
The share of the informal sector in total non-agricultural employment has been ex-
tremely high in both rural and urban areas. Across states, considerable variations exist but 
the relative size in most of the cases is on the high side. At the all-India level, the informal 
sector constituted around 78 per cent of the work force in 1999–2000 (in the rural and urban 
areas combined), which then increased to 84.5 per cent in 2004–05 (see Tables 1 and 2). 
2 See Mookherjee, Napel and Ray (2008). 
3 For 1999–2000 NSSO provided the absolute number of workers in the informal sector directly. The proportions have 
been calculated by considering the NSSO estimate of population for the year 1999–2000. Since the NSSO’s estimate of 
population is said to be grossly underestimated, these proportions are then applied to the absolute number of workers 
derived from the projected population of 1999–2000 on the basis of the decennial census figures. The adjusted set of 
absolute number of workers in the informal sector is then used for further analysis. 8




Transport Finance Service Aggregate
Andhra Pradesh 73.41 76.52 91.89 67.90 58.76 47.87 71.15
Arunachal Pradesh 6.34 20.45 49.86 42.07 7.42 1.41 12.89
Assam 82.26 62.96 86.42 65.85 46.22 34.46 58.51
Bihar & Jharkhand 74.93 49.02 78.29 59.53 63.10 36.04 62.57
Goa 30.48 68.71 80.08 64.13 26.81 14.63 55.82
Gujarat 73.45 69.86 91.07 67.46 56.02 25.53 67.38
Haryana 63.84 71.93 82.48 66.13 39.93 25.30 62.83
Himachal Pradesh 66.93 59.79 85.41 70.25 34.21 11.50 52.13
Jammu and Kashmir 92.17 80.41 87.92 60.30 58.34 9.47 59.41
Karnataka 76.30 71.57 86.96 66.88 46.54 27.55 67.23
Kerala 82.60 85.08 79.72 76.05 54.03 34.63 72.38
Madhya Pradesh & 
Chhattisgarh
71.00 53.78 90.28 66.25 54.88 26.91 62.94
Maharashtra 67.46 63.76 88.91 57.85 48.64 25.83 61.87
Manipur 90.60 91.81 87.79 79.80 34.55 12.39 54.47
Meghalaya 74.94 67.67 83.04 69.63 14.40 5.60 42.00
Mizoram 96.20 71.80 92.71 87.69 40.73 5.30 44.35
Nagaland 75.95 51.45 85.24 65.51 47.64 4.36 23.93
Orissa 83.88 60.31 89.35 57.20 47.95 33.83 68.92
Punjab 75.79 78.03 85.60 76.50 50.21 33.47 69.78
Rajasthan 85.76 76.93 93.93 73.27 54.39 28.06 72.54
Sikkim 76.50 66.59 96.63 79.74 39.68 4.66 41.24
Tamil Nadu 81.47 69.75 91.09 63.66 49.69 32.08 71.60
Tripura 76.65 57.00 72.96 79.35 37.00 28.61 47.57
Uttar Pradesh & 
Uttaranchal
82.88 74.15 91.73 75.67 59.04 44.79 75.51
West Bengal 84.22 73.16 90.83 74.13 53.86 36.77 74.95
Andaman 68.70 49.21 77.68 40.20 67.35 13.90 45.75
Chandigarh 62.03 77.92 89.13 80.89 60.44 17.89 57.21
Dadra 65.31 30.00 101.80 94.59 132.37 29.83 66.33
Daman 44.75 84.40 98.46 68.50 45.66 44.45 62.22
Delhi 80.21 66.54 89.55 68.95 51.53 15.18 62.81
Lakshadweep 23.53 35.49 10.89 24.29 0.00 0.33 12.64
Pondicherry 68.43 69.55 91.87 83.99 67.99 26.21 68.55
All-India 77.91 69.70 88.78 67.37 53.45 33.07 68.46
Note: Aggregate is the combination of all the non-agricultural activities shown in the Table.
Source: Informal Sector in India, 1999–2000, Report No. 459(55/2.0/2), National Sample Survey Organisation, Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation, May 20019





Transport Finance Service Aggregate.
Andhra Pradesh 87.66 92.59 95.56 80.18 68.39 79.66 87.13
Arunachal Pradesh 43.78 4.61 47.78 64.44 18.20 29.48 30.49
Assam 84.63 72.98 88.58 74.26 55.91 53.61 73.05
Bihar 93.67 76.98 89.85 78.41 83.55 77.87 85.95
Chhattisgarh 80.16 78.96 92.91 69.51 95.39 59.50 78.08
Delhi 80.68 70.55 93.71 65.82 43.83 45.96 70.96
Goa 47.53 92.73 89.09 72.04 97.43 43.73 70.88
Gujarat 73.46 90.07 96.13 84.09 75.14 68.84 80.73
Haryana 65.54 61.35 92.12 84.41 76.65 65.77 73.73
Himachal Pradesh 59.41 45.59 92.28 56.22 76.54 55.18 60.01
Jammu and Kashmir 88.94 59.36 89.27 85.82 79.87 51.42 74.02
Jharkhand 70.18 69.96 88.43 68.29 75.59 68.83 73.88
Karnataka 87.22 85.98 95.98 83.36 52.37 68.39 83.76
Kerala 87.16 88.75 95.54 82.00 82.11 53.21 82.00
Madhya Pradesh 67.84 75.11 89.32 73.51 81.77 66.24 75.15
Maharashtra 77.14 80.16 94.51 70.24 72.29 66.10 78.49
Manipur 81.35 67.81 82.36 76.38 22.83 37.95 64.77
Meghalaya 81.35 83.12 83.08 65.77 100.00 14.31 50.56
Mizoram 87.13 56.26 80.71 77.97 63.38 34.66 55.38
Nagaland 84.28 39.99 75.70 44.23 19.98 30.94 51.99
Orissa 90.26 71.34 94.10 74.93 72.60 71.23 82.99
Punjab 88.39 86.60 95.00 78.07 93.48 56.01 82.81
Rajasthan 94.80 84.02 94.39 87.43 86.55 60.12 85.02
Sikkim 86.86 61.77 74.19 81.20 0.00 17.67 51.20
Tamil Nadu 89.40 91.11 96.88 72.32 58.42 69.94 84.92
Tripura 84.06 65.48 75.69 70.16 83.41 26.90 51.82
Uttaranchal  73.65 86.76 90.04 81.16 80.94 49.66 74.78
Uttar Pradesh 88.71 84.00 93.84 77.36 83.54 76.26 86.29
West Bengal 89.22 88.35 92.98 78.00 74.77 67.92 84.19
Andaman 74.44 62.11 86.41 69.31 53.70 12.07 51.61
Chandigarh 77.92 85.83 88.55 53.60 97.50 59.44 72.67
Dadra 63.98 87.84 86.93 10.00 100.00 50.54 64.22
Daman 18.33 17.35 58.90 93.73 90.83 70.31 50.32
Lakshadweep 83.36 73.39 53.81 37.73 55.20 42.09 59.52
Pondicherry 66.87 96.86 91.65 86.59 83.45 50.22 76.77
All-India 84.54 81.95 94.44 77.38 69.16 67.12 82.05
Note: Aggregate is the combination of all the non-agricultural activities shown in the Table.
Source: Informal Sector and Conditions of Employment in India, 2004–05, Report No. 519(61/10/7), National Sample Survey Organi-
sation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, April 2007. 10
Theoretically, the informal sector can grow due to the supply side factors and/or the 
demand side factors. In the present specification, we have taken informal sector employ-
ment to be a function of certain demand side factors approximated by the formal sector 
employment in various activities. Next, we pose the question—if the actual (observed) level 
of informal sector employment is much above the level that can be explained in terms of 
formal sector employment. We have analysed this in the stochastic frontier function frame-
work. The distance of the actual informal sector employment from the level of informal sec-
tor employment, which can be explained in terms of formal sector employment, would 
represent the pressure of excess supplies. Higher the distance, the greater is the pressure of 
excess supplies of labour, leading to a residual absorption of labour in the low productivity 
activities in the informal sector.  
By applying the statistical stochastic frontier function framework we can identify, based 
on the cross-sectional data, the extent to which different states are above the level that can 
be explained in terms of formal sector employment. The stochastic frontier model for infor-
mal sector employment is given by: 
.
The frontier level informal sector employment is defined to be: 
 
The excess informal sector employment due to the supply side variable can be mea-
sured by the ratio of observed informal sector employment to the frontier level of employ-
ment. 
As regards the estimation procedure, log transformation of informal sector employment 
is regressed on the log transformation of various components of the formal sector employ-
ment. Cross-sectional data used for frontier function estimation requires a priori assumption 
regarding the one-sided distribution of the error term taken to measure the effect of supply-
push phenomenon. In this case we have assumed a half-normal distribution. The frontier 
equation is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood Estimation technique. 
Data from both the survey years (1999–2000 and 200–-05) have been taken, implying 
that we have two observations per state. Based on the magnitude of the Ui , the maximum 
value (indexed as 100) is chosen to represent the case with a maximum supply-push effect. 
Mizoram (1999–2000) corresponds to the maximum effect of excess supplies of labour. After 
assigning a value of 100 to Mizoram (1999–2000) other states have been indexed accord-
ingly (Table 3). 11
Table 3—Index of Supply-Push Informal Sector Employment 
State 1999-2000 2004–05 
Andhra Pradesh 53.55 94.43
Arunachal Pradesh 20.07 50.89
Assam 56.47 80.05




Himachal Pradesh 47.12 51.94
Jammu and Kashmir 71.82 87.67
Karnataka  52.72 92.77
Kerala 70.2 86.41
Madhya Pradesh & Chhattisgarh 43.34 70.62
Maharashtra 34.67 67.89
Manipur 83.51 77.26







Tamil Nadu 52.96 90.08
Tripura 73.4 68.09
Uttar Pradesh & Uttaranchal 65.51 90.65






Pondicherry  87.14 94.02
Source: Authors’ calculations.12
4. IMPORTANT CORRELATES 
The next question is: what determines this supply-push informal sector employment. An 
important determinant of labour productivity and wages in the organized industrial sector 
is technology. Most of the developing countries import technology from the western 
world since it has become cheaper to import after liberalization. UNIDO (2005) also in-
sists that a wheel which has already been discovered in one part of the world need not be 
rediscovered again by the developing world. In spite of the fact that the adaptation cost 
of the imported technology is not negligible, import of technology is believed to be cost 
effective. However, imported technology is often capital intensive in nature since it is 
manufactured to suit the economic conditions of the developed countries. Being capital 
intensive in nature, imported technology leads to a sluggish labour absorption in the or-
ganized industrial sector with a substantive rise in labour productivity (Kato and Mitra 
2008). As part of the labour productivity growth is transferred to the workers in terms of 
wage increase and this holds the possibility of widening the industrial-informal sector 
wage gap. With higher wage gaps, the informal sector workers may like to withdraw and 
strive hard to seek an employment in the organized industrial sector (Mitra, 1994). A 
similar result may also be observed if the informal-sector wage rate declines in response 
to an increase in supply given the formal sector wage rate (Mitra 2004). Some of the in-
formal sector workers may like to withdraw from the labour market completely as the 
market wage may be substantially lower than their reservation wage. However, the pos-
sibility of observing a positive relationship between the wage gap and the informal sector 
employment is not ruled out because a rise in wage gap may lead to an increase in migra-
tion, which, in turn, can result in a residual absorption of labour. So it would be interest-
ing to assess which of the two mechanisms dominates or whether they neutralize each 
other.
Among the other determinants of productive employment is skill formation. Since 
direct information on skill formation is not available, education may be taken as a proxy. 
With higher levels of education, the quality of labour is expected to improve which, in 
turn, would reduce the residual absorption of labour in the informal sector. However, 
what we have taken in the model is only the enrolment ratio and not the number of years 
of education. With a rise in developmental expenditure, the quality of human capital is 
expected to improve and this, in turn, would reduce the distress-led informalization. The 
other variable that we have considered in the model relates to revenue expenditure. With 
greater government activities the employment opportunities are likely to increase, which 
may induce migration and labour supplies. Supplies of labour, exceeding demand and/or 13
skill mismatch, can essentially lead to supply-push growth of the informal-sector. Since 
we have observations per state at two points of time one time dummy has been intro-
duced. 
Revenue expenditure and development expenditure are taken as a percentage of total 
net state domestic product (NSDP). On the other hand, wage gap is measured as the differ-
ence between the real wage rate pertaining to the organized industry (taken from the An-
nual Survey of Industries for respective years) and the wage rate of the hired workers in the 
unorganized manufacturing enterprises (taken from NSSO reports on unorganized manufac-
turing enterprises). The nominal wages are deflated by the consumer price index for indus-
trial workers at 1993–94 prices. Enrolment ratio is defined as the proportion of students ad-
mitted to engineering and management studies (including all vocational institutes and ITIs) 
to the total number of students.  
The regression results support most of the hypotheses (Table 4). Industrial-informal 
sector wage gap and developmental expenditure are seen to reduce the relative size of 
supply-push informal sector employment.  The year dummy turns out to be significant 
with a positive coefficient, implying that the intercept corresponding to the second time 
point has been larger than the first. The relative size of the index, in fact, is higher in the 
year 2004–05 compared to 1999–2000 in most of the states (Table 3). Revenue expendi-
ture takes a positive coefficient. The only variable which is not significant is the enrol-
ment ratio. As already indicated above, this is in any case not a good proxy for skill for-
mation. 
In the next stage, we try to estimate the impact of supply-push informal sector employ-
ment on inequality and poverty. If the informalization process is demand induced, incomes 
in the informal sector are expected to rise which may reduce income/expenditure inequality. 
On the other hand, if informalization is supply-push, inequality is expected to increase. The 
empirical estimate of the second equation based on the two-stage-least-square technique 
shows a positive association between the index of supply push informal sector employment 
and the Gini index of expenditure inequality. With poverty, however, there is no relationship, 
implying that there could be many factors other than employment related ones, which would 
impinge on the well-being (Table 4). 14
Table 4: Regression Results




























R2 0.83 0.61 0.006
No. of Observations 30 30 30
Note: ** and *  represent significance at 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.  
INFINDEX =  Index of Informality, WAGEGAP= Formal and Informal wage difference, DEVEXP= Share of Development 
Expenditure as percentage of NSDP, REVEXP= Share of Revenue Expenditure as percentage of NSDP, ENROL = Percentage 
of students enrolled in management and technical education. INTER = Intercept and Dummy stands for year dummy.
Source: DEVEXP and REVEXP are based on information given in the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve 
Bank of India (2000 and 2005). ENROL is based on information given in the Statistical Abstract, Central Statistical Organi-
zation, Government of India (2000 and 2005). The details relating to other variables are given in the text.15
5. CONCLUSION
On the basis of NSSO data, this paper has worked out the absolute number of formal and 
informal sector workers across the Indian states. Using a statistical stochastic frontier func-
tion framework, we derived the index of informal sector employment which is attributed to 
the supply-push phenomenon. Factors that explain the inter-state variations in this index 
include industrial-informal sector wage gap, revenue expenditure and development expen-
diture incurred by the government. Although skill formation is thought to be an important 
determinant of the quality of employment, the enrolment ratio turned out to be insignifi-
cant, possibly because the enrolment ratio is not a good proxy for skill formation. However, 
these results also need to be interpreted in the backdrop of  the rationalization provided in 
the theoretical construct which undermines the role of education under certain conditions. 
Enrolment will be effective for formal sector expansion only when developmental expendi-
ture is substantial. 
Increased development expenditure is seen to bring  a decline in  distress-led informal-
ization. With improved education, health, and infrastructure facilities, the employability of 
an individual goes up which, in turn, reduces the residual type of employment. However, 
expansion in government activities, measured through increased revenue expenditure, raises 
in-migration, which in turn raises the supply-push phenomenon. We also observed that with 
an increase in distress-led informalization, inequality tends to rise although poverty does not 
show a clear-cut relationship with supply-push informalization. The wage gap between the 
organized industrial sector and the unorganized/informal sector reduces residual type em-
ployment as workers aspire to acquire an industrial job. Adoption of labour intensive tech-
nology in the organized industrial sector is, indeed, crucial for pro-poor growth. The other 
policy implication is in terms of enhanced investment in the areas of education, health and 
physical infrastructure.  16
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